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COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ARMS RACE
nv D. D. SIFIAK
A new nonlinear and non stationary tnodel is proposed for the arms race, which is a modification of the
competitive equilibrium model used in economics to describe multiple markets of gross substitute
commodities or services. By recognizing the fact that such models ore described by Kanike 's functions,we
will combine the powerful mathematical machinery of the comparison principle from the theory of
differential inequalities, with the strong results obtained in the analysis of competitive equilibrium, tocome
up with new qualitative results concerning the arms race. By using the framework of the connective
stability concept, we will resolve the central problem of alliwices and neutrality in thearms race. We will
show that formnation of alliances or neutral countries cannot destabilize the armsrace, but is likely to act as
a stabilizing factor in the aimnanlent processes of hostile nations involved in the arnis race.
I. INTRODUcTION
Once it was recognized in [1] that the armament matrix in Richardson's model [2]
of the arms race is a Metzler matrix, a whole host of strong results obtained in
economic studies [3, 4] was made available for qualitative analysis of thearms
race. Positivity of the armament process is a direct consequence of this fact.
Another important result is that the classical Hicks conditions [4can be applied
to show positivity and stability of the armament equilibrium, as they were used to
establish the same properties of the equilibrium price on multiple markets ofgross
substitute commodities or services. Recently, the concept of connective stability
[5-8] was introduced in the study of competitive equilibrium under structural
perturbations [7]. When applied to the arms race, the concept providesan answer
to the central question of how formations of alliances and neutral countries affect
the armaments of the countries involved in the armsrace. We will show that
alliances improve stability of the arms race and, at thesame time, decrease the
level of armaments at the equilibrium.
By carrying a step further the analogy between the armaments and prices,we
propose a new nonlinear and nonstationary model for the arms race, which was
introduced recently [9] as a nonstationary generalization of the nonlinear model
studied extensively in the general competitive analysis in economics [10,11]. As
expected, it is not possible for the new model to duplicate all the results obtained
in the rich HicksMetzler algebraic setting [4] for linear constant models. How-
ever, the new model is more appealing in bringing closer the mathematical
representation to the nonlinear and nonstationary reality underlying thearms
race problems. We will be able to show again under reasonable conditions, that
the formation of alliances cannot destabilize a stable armamentprocess. If the
arms race is stable, it is also connectively stable. Pretty much the same conditions
assure the existence of a unique equilibrium ray and its attractivity in the first
quadrant of the armament space. Therefore, the proposed model has rich and
meaningful properties to motivate future applications of the competitive ana!ysis
[7-13] to the study of armament processes.
2832,FoRr1ATIoN OF ALLIANCESAND CONNECTIVE STABILITY
In order to place in proper perspective thegeneralizations of arms race
models proposed in this work, letus briefly review the original Richardson model
[2]. The model is a linear constant differentialequation
(1) ,rrrAx+b,
where x= {x1,x2,..,, x} is the armamentnvector,A =(a11) is then x narma-
ment matrix, andb = {b1, b2,...,b}is the grievance a vector. The elementsa of Aare such that
(2) 1<0,a,40i=j
i
That is, the defense off-diagonalelements a,, are nonnegativeso that an increase
in armament of one hostilenation causes an increase inarmaments of all hostile
nations involved in the armsrace. Arms build-up in each nation, isopposed by cost and fatigue effects whichare reflected in the Richardson model bynegativity of the diagonal elementsa1, of the armament matrixA.The vectorbin (1)
represents grievances and ambitions of thecountries in the arms race, whichcause the arms build-up in eachnation even if the threatsare absent. Therefore, the vectorbis assumed to benonnegative, that is,its componentsh,0,i = 1, 2,..., a, which we denote byb0.
Richardson's characterization ofan alliance in the arms race is: "Whenan alliance is formed, the defensecoefficients between allies sinkto zero" [2]. A suitable framework forconsideration of alliances and neutralitydescribed by this statement, is the concept of connectivestability [5-8].
Let us define the elementsof the armament matrix Aas
a + e11a,1, I=/ a,1=
(e,p, i
where a,>a0, a,are real numbers, ande,are elements of then X n Constant matrix E= (e,,).We need first the following:
Definition 1: By E= (ëq) we denote the n X a fundamentalinterconnection matrix with binary elements
1,the state x, actson the state x-
[0, the statex, does not act on tile statex1.
Then, we recall the following:
DefinitIon 2: By E(e11) we denotea constant n Xninterconnection matrix generated from tile a Xn fundamentai interconnection matrix E = (e1) by replacing the unit elements e,, withthe numberseq such that
Oseql,
and the zero elements e,1 of thematrix E remain thezero elements e,1 of the matrixF. We also need the following:
284Definition 3: By' we denote the class of all interconnection matrices E generated
from a fundamental interconnection matrix E.
We immediately note that according to Definitions 1-3, the matrix E is also
a member of the class.The effect of these Definitions 1-3 is that for each
interconnection matrix E=(e11) we have a different system (1). The underlying
idea of the concept of connective stability is a possibility to establish stability of a
class of systems (1) corresponding to matrices Ee ' by proving stability of one
member of that class corresponding to EE
The equilibria of the arms race are constant solutions of equation (1)
determined by the algebraic equation
Ax-Fb0.
If det A0, the equilibrium f is a constant vector
= -A'b,
which is the unique solution of (6). We notice from (3) and (7) that for each E, the
system (1) has a distinct equilibrium x. By(1) we denote the systemdescribed by
equation (1) and the interconnection matrices of class,and formulate the
following:
Definition 4: The system .9is said to be connectively stable if and only if the
equilibrium xC of equation (1) is stable in the sense of Liapunov for all E c
To establish conditions for stability of system (1) expressed by Definition 4,
let us recall McKenzie's definition of a quasidominant diagonal matrix [14]: An
nXn matrix A=(a11) is called quasidominant diagonal if there exist positive




Since A is a Metzler matrix [3], (8) is necessary and sufficient [14-16] for stability
of A. To establish connective stability of S(j), we denote by A= (a,)the matrix A
which correspoids to the fundamental interconnection matrix E, and prove the
following:
Theorem 1. The system 9°( 'is connectively asymptotically stable in the large if and
only if the matrix A is quasidominant diagonal.
Proof. Since A is a Metzler matrix [3], the quasidomnant property (8)is
necessary and sufficient [14-16] for stability of (1) for E=E. This establishes the
"only if" part of the theorem. To prove the "if" part, we note that A is a Metzler
matrix for all Eand that
(9) AA,VEe
holds element-by-element (that is, A - A0). Thus, if (8) holds forE,it holds for
allEand .9'(I) is a connectively stable system. This proves Theorem 1.
As for interpretations of Theorem 1 in the context of the arms race, several
Remarks are in order:
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Remark 1.FromTheorem 1, we conclude immediately that if an arms race is
stable, then "sinking to zero" ofany number of interconnect'ni elements, which
describes formation of alliances in theRichardson sense, cannot destabilize the
arms race, Furthermore such effect of alliances wouldonlystrengthen ine-
qualities (8) and, therefore, make thearms race more stablethanit was before the
alliance was formed. Itmay be argued against Richardson's description of alliance
formation, that the interconnectionelements in the alliance are notzero but stay
on some positive values. This is, ofcourse, included in the connective stability
since we merely use the inequality(9), and require that theinterconnection
elements among countries involvedin an alliance decrease after itis formed,
which is reasonable toexpect. It may he further argued, however, thatafter an
alliance is formed the countriesnot involved in the alliance would increasethe interaction coethcients correspondingto the allied countries. This effect isnot included in connective stability,but the quasidominant condition (8)is still a good
measure of how much of the increasescan be tolerated by stability.
Remark 2. From connectivestability, it follows than an equilibriumx exists for all E e'. Furthermore, since A isa Metzler matrix for allFE 'and b0, we can
use [3] and conclude that the solutions x(1; t, x0)of (1) are nonnegative, that is,
(10) x(1; t, x0)O,it0
for allt0and x00. En other words, thearmaments are always nonnegative if they "start" nonnegative regardlessof the alliance formations.From connective stability of S(1) we concludethat x(t;t, x0) = efor all 1, x0, and EE Thereforee0, for all F if the grievance vector ispositive (b >0) thenwe can further show that so is thecorresponding equilibrium. As shownin [3], if a Metzler matrix A satisfies(8), then (and only then) Ais nonpositive. However, A' cannot havea row of zeros since it satisfies (8)and, thus, it is nonsingular Therefore, from positivityof b and (7). followspositivity of the armsrace equilibriumx'for all Ec g,
it further can be concludedthat if A satisfies (8), thenfrom (9) follows A' Am [15].Therefore, appiying(7),we have lef, where iA'b is the armament equilibrium for F=F. The inequality le>.f establishes the factthat a formation of alliances is likelyto decrease the armaments levelsat the equilibrium for all countries involved inthe arms race.
Remark 3. Sinceconnective stability involves E=0, we conclude that
(11) a11=+e11a1, <0, i1, 2.....
for all Fe. That is, each country involved in thearms race must exhibit the "expense and fatigue" effectfor the armsrace to be stable.
Once the armamentmatrix is recognizedas a Metzler matrix, another possibility is open for furthergeneralizations of the armsrace models. That is,we can use the powerful analysisof competitiveequilibrium [10] in nonlinear multiple market modelscoupled with the comparisonprinciple from the theoryof differential inequalities [17]to come up withnew important results. Thisroute was made available only recentlyby a study ofnonslationary competitiveproces- ses [9], amid will be shown inthe following developmentto be suitable for
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establishing the qualitative characteristics of the arms race expressed by the above
Remarks, in a much more general setting, but at the cost of a niore retined
analysis.
Another nonlinear generalization of the Richardson model was proposed
and analyzed by Sandberg [18] using a different mathematical framework. The
major difference between Sandberg's model and the one presented here, is that
we follow Caspary's critique [191 of the Richardson model, and assume that
relative rather than absolute armament levels motivate countries to arm. The
armaments in the arms race can be treated as prices of commodities (or services)
on multiple markets, and the competitive analysis becomes an idealsetting for
studying qualitative characteristics of armament processes.
3. A (JI-NIRAL.Moon.




'is the armament vector; h:x -* i" is the function describ-
ing the interaction of armament levels among the countries; and g: .-*'is the
function representing the grievances that motivate the countries to ann regardless
400)-. .,i of the armament levels. We assume that h(t, x) c C(J X 9 .) and g(t) E t.
where=ft+) and T is a number or the symbol -, *" is the real n-
dimensional Euclidean vector space, and = {x e x0).
As in the classical Richardson model (1), we assume that an increase in the
armament level of one country causes an increase in the armament level of the
other countries involved in the arms race. Therefore, we say that the function
h(t, x) belongs to the class of functions
)l: h1(t,a)<1i(t,b),V(!,a),(f,h)ex4
a1=b.a1<b1;iEM,jEN-M
where N is the set of indices 41, 2, ...,n}, and M is a nonvoid subset of N.
If (12) is used to represent multiple markets of commodities or services, then
the fact that the excess demand function h (1, x) Cmeans that (12) describes the
time-dependent gross substitute case introduced in [81. More importantly, in
[8, 91, the class of functions X was recognized as Kamke's functions, and powerful
methods of comparison principle [17] were made available for analysis of non-
stationary competitive processes.
By following Caspary's critique [19] of the Richardson model, we assume
that a nation's security is dependent upon the relative rather than the absolute size
of its own and its opponent's forces. This amounts to assuming that
hO,Ax)=h(t,x),VA>O,
which is a time-dependent version of the usual "positive" homogeneity condition
of degree zero, well-known in the traditional microeconomics analysis.
287Finally, we assume that there existsa positive equilibriumxeas a solution of
the equation
(15) h(t,x)+g(t)=O,
such that XeE, where{xEE:x>O} is an open cone in It should be
noted here that for (15) to havea constant solution x c %', it is more realistic to
assume that g is a constant vector. Our results however,do not depend on
constancy of g.
Let us summarize the properties ofthe function h(t, x) as the following
hypotheses:
(H1)h(t, x).K;
(H2)hO, Ax)= h(t, x),VA >0
(H3)xe>0: h(t,xe)+ g(1)= VtE.T.
Our immediate interest is theexistence of solutions x(t; t0, xo) ofequation (12) on the time interval TY0=[t0,+co). A preliminary resultto the existence
question is the following:
Lemma 1. If the function h(t,x) satisfies the hypotheses (H1),(K2), and (H3), then
there exists a unique equilibriumray= {x
e
E := Ae} of equation (12), where
e = {1, 1,.. ., 1} is an n vector andA is a positive number.
Using Lemma 1, onecan show the following:
Theorem 2. If the function h(t.x) satisfies the hypotheses (H1),(H2), and (H3), then there existsa solution x(t; t, x0) of equation (12) forany (t0, x0) and for alltegT0.
Both Lemma 1 and Theorem2 are proved in AppendixA following references [9] as slightly strongerLemma A. 1 and Theorem A.1. From the proof of TheoremA.!, one concludes directlythat under the hypotheses (H1)(H3), all solutionsare bounded on .Sfor(t0,xo)e Tx. Fur- therinore, the Solutionsare positive, that is, they have thefollowing property:
(P1)(t0, x0)x ''x(t; to, x0)',WE
and the open coneis an invariant set.
The property (P1) is importantin the context of thearms race in that the armaments during the adjustmentprocess never become negative.It is a pleasing fact to conclude thatnonnegativity of the armamentprocess (10) established for the simple Richardsonmodel, carries over to thegeneralized model (12). As in the Richardson model, positivityof the armaments isessential for demonstratingthe structural properties of the model(12) in the context ofconnectivity. As shown in [9], hypotheses(H1)(H3) implynot only that thecone '' is an invariant set, but that it isalso a region of attractionof the equilibriumray.c That is, we demonstratethe following propertyof the solutioi x(t;t,x0):
(P2)(t0, xo)Ex Jim d[x(t; t0, xo),J=o
288where d(x,= flfxE{IIx - XeIIN} , IIXII=SUPJN {lIsII}. That is, in the Appendix,
we prove Theorem A,2 which is slightly stronger than the following:
Theorem 3. lithe function h(t, x) satisfies the hypotheses (H,), (H2), and (H3),
then the solutions x(t; t0, x0) of equation (12) have the property (P2).
Theorem 3 can be widened to include a connective version of the property
(P2). For this purpose, we specify the components h1(t, x) of the function h(t, x) as
h(t,x)=&,(i,x1,e11x1,..,e11x1, .,e1,,x,,),inN
where eq are elements of the n x n interconnection matrix E.
We introduce the "nonlinear" analog to Definition 5 as the following:
Definition 5. The system is said to be connectively aifractive if and only if the
equilibrium rayof equation (12) has the property (P2) for all E E'.
To be able to establish the connective version of (P2).as specified by
Definition 5, we require the interconnection matrices E to be indecomposable [4].
That is, we consider the class of matrices' such that Enimplies that E cannot
be permuted into a matrix of the form
E=1Eh10
1E21E22
where E11, E22 are square submatrices of E and 0 is a rectangular block of zeros.
Equation (12) and the class of interconnection matricesdefine the 9'(12.
By h(t, x) we denote the function h(t, x) in (16) which corresponds to the
fundamental interconnection matrix En'. We need the following hypotheses:
(H1)h(t, x) n
(R2)h(t, Ax) = h(r. x),VA >0.
Now, we prove the following:
Theorem 4. If the function k(t, x) satisfies the hypotheses (F11)_and (H2), and the
function h(t, x) satisfies the hypothesis (H3) for all En,then '(I2) is connectively
attractive.
P'oof. From (16), indeconiposability of En ,and the property (P1), it follows
that h(t, x) n 1 implies h (t, x) n X for all E E'. That is, if h(t, x) satisfies (H,),
then h(t, x) satisfies (H,) for allEn'. Furthermore, if h(t, x) satisfies (H2), then
h(t, x) satisfies (H2) for all En '. Therefore, under the conditions of the Theorem,
h(t, x) satisfies the hypotheses (H1)-(H3) for all En ', and by Theorem 3 system
g'(,2) is connectively attractive. This proves Theorem 4.
Unfortunately, by Theorem 4 we are not providing the entire "nonlinear"
analog to Theorem 1 since we are not able to express our conditions only in terms
of the function h(t, x). That comes from our inability to show that if h(t, x) satisfies
(H3) so does h(t, x) for all En.
As in Remark 1, we conclude that under somewhat restricted conditions
(Eninstead of En ), formation of alliances in the general model (12), cannot
ruin stability of the arms race. Remark 2 has not its counterpart in the general
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Imodel (12). As for the Remark 3, we can show that there is a "nonlinear"
counterpart to the necessary conditioi (II)), which is expressed by
(18) h(t, a)h1(t, b), a, >b,, a1 =b1, i j;i,JEN.
Condition (18) is a necessary condition for system(12) to have the property (P2).
and represents the "expense and fatigue" effect established in the linear model (1)
by the condition (11). Aproofof necessity of (18) is provided by Theorem A.3 of
the Appendix.
4. Cor'.cusior'
By exploring the analogy between the competitive equilibrium in economics
and the arms race models, we were able to show a number of results concerning
the armament processes involving hostile countries. The most important conclu
sion reached by the foregoing analysis is that the formation of alliatices or neutral
countries, cannot destroy stability, hut is likely to stabilize the arms race. It would
be interesting to show that the same conclusion can he made for the stochastic
arms race model [1] on the basis of results obtained for model ecosystems in
randomly varying environment [201 and stochastic large-scale systems [211.
5.ACKNOWLED(IMENT
The author is grateful to Professor G. S. Ladde, Department of Mathematics,
State University of New York at Potsdam, Potsdam, New York, for his help in
proving the theorems in the Appendix.
APPENDIX
In this section, we will establish the existence result that is slightly stronger
than that expressed by Theorem 2.
For simplicity, let us rewrite the equation (29) as
(A.l) =f(t, x),
where f(t, x)=/z(t, x)+g(t) and, therefore, f(i, x)E C°°(5x withtEXE





To prove the existence result for (A.!),we first establish the following[91:
Lempna A.1. If the function f(t, x) satisfies the hypotheses(H), (H) and (H),
then forany two vectors u>0,v>0,uv, there exist indices k, I EN,ksuch that
(A.2) fk (:, u) <Ik(1, v).f,(t,a) >f(t, v)
for each fixed I EJandall a, v E
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SProof.Definek =maxE,u/v}, n, = min-{u/vJ for any pairof vectors u. v>
0.Witheach pair (a, v), we associate the pair (u±, u*) given as= u
u, so that uu and uv. That is, u,v1, Ik, u=Vk and likewise,
v, I u=v1, and since uv, at least for some I we have a,, <v,, a?>
v, ik,I 1.
From (H) and (H), we have
fk(t,a) =1'. (t, u)<f,,(t, v), f(t, u) =f,(i,u*) >f,(t,v)
for eachtE¶ which proves Lemma A.1.
We recall that the equilibrium ray of (A.1) is .={xeE,x' =Ae}, where
e=(1, 1,..., 1} such that eEand A >0. We provide the following:
Proof of Lemma I. Uniqueness ofmeans that for any pair of equilibrium values
X', X" E e,x'x",
f(t,x")=f(1,x0x"=Ax'
for all t eand some A >0.
Define p.=min1{x/x'}, where4, 4'are the i-th components of the two
equilibria x', x", and x"= p.x". Then, we have x"'x', that is, x74,i1, x7'=4
and at least for some Ix7< x. Assume that the statement (A,4) is false. That is
x"Ax', for all A>0. By (H)(H) and f(t,x")=f(t,x')=O, we have 0=
f,(t, x")=f1(t.x")<f1(t,x')0, which is absurd. The proof of Lemma 1 is com-
plete.
Remark 4. If we take any pair of vectors f, xEsuch thate E,xl', and use
Lemma 1 and inequalities (A,2), we conclude thatfk (1, x) <0 arid/ (1, x) >0 for all
t and some indices k, / EN.
To establish the existence result for equation (A.!), wc can replace the
hypotheses (H)(H) by the following weaker hypothesis: (H)f(t, Xe)=04,XeE
',and for any x eand x9 .' and anye there exists a pair of indices k, lEN,
ksuch that
Xk=max{x}fk(, x)<0, x=min{x}'f1(t, x)>0
lEN iEN
for alltE.9T.
In view of Remark 4, (Ii)(H) imply (H) but not vice versa.
Now, we can prove a slightly stronger result than that of Theorem 2, which we
state as the following[91:
Theorem A. 1. Ifthefunctionf(i, x) satisfies the hypothesis (H), then there exists a
solution x(i)=x(t;,xo) for any (t0, x0)EXand for all t E °10




and note'c6". For any r>0, we define the time interval=[r0, 10+rJ and
the rectangle YIXf". By continuity of 1(1, x) we can find a number p. >0 such that
J(t,x)Ip.s, for all (t, x)Ex Ps" and all i EN. By Peano's existence Theorem
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and
[22], there exists at least one solution x(t) for all tEll0. t0+e], where r=
mm {r, Now, either x(1) Efor some t1 E (to, (0+ ri], or x(t) for all
t E (to, t+ rj. In the first case, the solution x(l) edsts for all t c If we have the
second case, then we extend successively the solutionx(l)beyond the time
interval (to, to+r1].
Note that for all tc[t0, t0+e1], x(t)E'. In fact, we can show that x(t)E'
for all[ta, to+e1]. Since x by using (H), we have (A.5) with x=x0 which
implies for t=to,
fk(lo,x0)<0, fi(to,xo)>O.
By continuity of f(t, x) and x(t), wecan find a 8 >0 such that
fk[t,x(t)]<0,fill,x(t)]>0,Vtc[t0, t+6,}
which by integration yields
Xk(t)X(j,x,(t)x10,VtE{l, ( + 8]
which in turn, implies that x(1)E A' for allt'e [la, t + 6k]. Since x(t0 + 61]E" and
also x(t0+61)g', by using(H),we have
(A.J0) fk[to+61, x(t0+61)]<O,fi[lo+8i, x(t0+61)]>O
and conclude that there exists a 62 >0 such that
fk{t, x(t)]<O,f[t,x(t)]>0,
Vt[0+61,10+61+62]
Xk(t):SXk(tO+ 6), x,(r) x,(t0± 6),
VrE[0+61, (0+61+62].
Therefore, (A.8) and (A.12) imply that x('for all tE{10, (0+81+32]. By
continuing this process, one arrives in finitenumber of steps to the conclusion that
x(t) E' for all{t, t± nj.
Since x(t) remains in' for the entire interval [ta,t+ ni], by using the above
arguments, one can show that the solution x(t)can be extended over the interval
[10+nj, t+2e1] and, thus,over the interval ET =[t, 10± T]. Moreover,x(t)E' for all te Y1.
Because, the solution x(t)stays inside'for the entire interval =
[fe, t+ TI, it can be extendedover the interval f2=[t0+r, to+2r1 bychoosing subintervals of Y2 determined byn2=mm {i, a//.L2}, wherep.2 is defined by the conditionIf(t, x)IP2. for all (I, x) e2 x" and i e N. Moreover,one shows as before that x(t)c' for all t E2 Therefore, x(t)E' for all t EUIn this manner, a solution staying in' can be found for allIE T0. This proves Theorem A.1.
Now, we can establish the attractivityproperty of the equilibriumrayof equation (A.1) by the following[9]:
Theorem A.2. Ifthefunctjon f(i, x)satisfies the hypothesis (H),then the solutions x(t; to, x0) of equation (A.I) have theproperty (P2).
292Proof. To prove Theorem A.2, we use the Liapunov-like function V:
V(x)=d(x,'),
V(x) Ck) and V(x) is Lipchitzian, which has
DV(x)minflf(t,x)},V(1,x)Ex-
where L is a nonvoid subset of N defined by the set of alli EN such that
jf,(r, x)I >0.
To show (A. 14). we note that for each(t, x) E-there exists A0> 0
such that V(x) can be rewritten as V(x)=maxIEN{x,Ao}. To see this, we
recognize the fact that the distance between a point x and the rayis equal to the
distance between the point x and the foot x°e' of the normal drawn from the
point x to the rayFurthermore, there exists an index setLsuch that
V(x)=x1Aoj for all in L. Now, by hypothesis (H), for in Lwe have either
f(t, x)<0, orf(t, x)>0 and, therefore, f(t,x)I>0, in L. By continuity off(t, x)
and fort>0 sufficiently small, we conclude that the index set L remains
invariant.
We proceed to compute DV(x) as follows:
V[x+if(t,x)] V(x)=1x+tf1(t, i)AoIkAoI,Vin L.
There are two cases to be considered: (i) xA0>0, and (ii) x1A0<O, for
in L. In either case, (A.15) can be rewritten as
VIx +irf(r, x)] V(x) =t!f1(t, x), ViEL.
When (i), then f1(t, x) <0, and when (ii), then 1(t, x) >0. Hence, from (A.16),we
get
V{x +itf(t, x)]- V(x)= -tIf1(t, x)I,ViEL
and finally, (A.14) is established from (A.17).
The second part of the proof consists in showing that the function V(x)
defined in (A.13) with (A.14) implies property (P2). Let x(t)= x(t; t, x0) be any
solution of (A.1) for(ia, x0) E Tx..Then, x(t)E' for all In ff0, where' was
defined in (A.6). Set
p(t)= Vfx(t)J.
For sufficiently small Lt >0, we have
p(I+t)p(t)= V[x(t+iXt)] V[x(t)]
= V[x(t+it)] V(x(g)-ftf[t, x(t)])
+ V(x(1)+Litf{t, x(r)]) V[x(t)J.
By using the fact that V(x) is Lipschitzian, from (A.19), we obtain
Dp(t)srnin {If[t, x()]I},Vtn &.
IEL
293We proceed toestablishthe property (P2) by contradiction. That is, forsome
e >0, (ta, xo)' x, there exists 1 >t0 and a sequence {tk}, 1 >t,4 +, k-*
+o., such thatd[xltk),=r and d[x(t), C}>e for IC Ok 6+1)- Let us denote
" ={x C' :d(x, r}, which is a compact set. For any t and any fixed
xE", there exists an index subset LN such thatthe function 0(i,.)=
min1L {lf(t,i)I}>0. By continuity of O(t, 1), there existsa neighborhood C(.) of
C" such that0(1,x)> 0, for all x e U(i). Let °//= {(i):i E"} open cover of
". Since'" is compact, by HeineBoret Theorem[23], we can extract a finite
subcover {C(.). C(12).....(i,)}, whereto each C(.,) there corresponds an
index subset L, and the function0(t,x)min,. {f(t, x)I}. We define i,t'(t. x)
mm1 {O(t, x), 02(t,x).....0(t, x)}, andnote that'(t, X)E d°'°Tx") and
'(t, x)>0, for all (t, x)eJ x s". Therefore,we can take ip(i, x)= Q(t)and
ç(t)E d1(y)since" is compact.
Now, from inequality (A.20),we can derive
(A.21) Dp(t)(t),
where x(t)", t[t,tk-4-J. Integrating (A.2 I) from tto and using the
definitions (A.14) and (A.I) of V(x)and p(t) we obtain
('k *
Op(tk+t)p(tk)s-J'p(r)dT<O
which is absurd. Therefore, theproof of Theorem A.2 iscomplete.
As the final part of the Appendix,let us prove the following:
Theorem 4.3. If the functionf(t, x) satisfies the hypotheses(Hi), (H), and (H;), and solutions x(t; t., x0) ofequation (A.1) have theproperty (P2), 1/len
f1(i, a)fj(t, b), a > b1. a1=b1, ij;i,jEN.
Proof. Suppose that (A.23)is false. This would implythat for some i C N,
f1(t, a)>f,((,b),
(A.22)
foi all a, b such thata > b1 >0, 0< a1b1, Ij.Then. (A.24) is equivalentto
(A.25) [(t, a1,..., a-_., a, a11.....a)
>J(t, a1,..., b, .., an).
This together with (A.23)and the fact that f(t, x) iscontinuous and belongs to', implies that
f1(t, a1, ..-, a_1, a, a,+ .....a)
>f,(t,a1.....for all a >0. From (A.26) and the fact that under conditions of the Theorem
*(1; I, .o) ewe conclude that the i-th component x(l; i, x0) of the solution
x(:;,x0) is a strictly increasing function for all 1.which contradicts the
property (P2). This proves Theorem A.2.
University of Santa Clara
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